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We examine the impact of government transfers and the business cycle on poverty in the United States in the context of
a poverty function that includes the official poverty rate, three types of government transfers, real wages, the number of
female-headed families, and a business cycle variable. Using cointegration techniques, we find ─   c o n t r a r y   t o   m o s t  
previous studies ─   t h a t   g o v e r n m e n t   t r a n s f e r   p r o g r a m s   p l a y   a n   i m p o r t a n t   p o v e r t y -reducing role. In addition, the findings
suggest that the business cycle is one of the key variables in explaining poverty in the US. Furthermore, the empirical
results show that the size and composition of public transfer payments change over the business cycle. We also find
poverty to have a significant effect on government transfers, the business cycle, and the structure of households.
I. INTRODUCTION
The question of whether, how, and to what extent public transfer payments affect poverty in the
United States has been debated over decades, with no consensus in sight (see, e.g. Hoynes et al.,
2005). At the center of this debate are basically two arguments. The first, quite obvious argument,
which is based on the generally poverty-reducing role of public transfers, is that transfers decrease
poverty by raising the incomes of the poor. The second argument hypothesizes that antipoverty
benefits increase poverty by decreasing the labor supply of current and all potential future transfer
recipients. The logic behind this is that antipoverty benefits act as a substitute for income from
* Correspondence to: Dierk Herzer, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University, Schumannstr. 60, 60325 Frankfurt am Main,
Germany (DierkHerzer@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de).
1 In one of four equations Gottschalk and Danziger (1984) find a statistically significant negative effect of transfers.
1employment. Increases in benefit payments thus make dependency on the government more
attractive than the alternative of self-support. Furthermore, as the marginal poor spend more time
being dependent upon transfers and less time working, their skills depreciate, in turn reducing their
chances of finding a job, earning money, and moving out of poverty. Hence, through the negative
impact of higher transfer payments on work incentives, they can seriously raise the poverty rate ─  
not only by increasing the number of transfer recipients but also by increasing the duration of
poverty (see, e.g., Gwartney and McCaleb, 1985).   A s   t h i s   “ w o r k   d i s i n c e n t i v e   e f f e c t ”acts against
the “ i n c o m e   e f f e c t ”   o f   t r a n s f e r   p a y m e n t s ,   t h e   n e t   p o v e r t y   e f f e c t   of government transfers is
theoretically indeterminate and thus becomes an empirical issue.
Unfortunately the empirical evidence is mixed as well. Peterson and Rom (1989), using US
state panel data, find a statistically significant positive correlation between government transfers
and changes in the poverty rate. Similarly, the aggregate time series regressions by Blank and
Blinder (1986) suggest that after 1982, increases in welfare spending in relation to GNP were linked
to increases in poverty. In contrast, the time series results by Gottschalk and Danziger (1984),
1
Balke and Slottje (1993), Formby et al. (2001), Vedder and Gallaway (2001), Enders and Hoover
(2003), and Hoover et al. (2004) show no statistically significant relationship between government
transfers and poverty. Osberg (2000) and Hoynes et al. (2005), also using US state panel data, find
that increases in government transfers actually lead to statistically significant reductions in poverty
rates. However, most of these studies suffer from serious econometric shortcomings.
A major limitation of the existing studies is that they fail to consider whether government
transfers and poverty are cointegrated and thus whether there exists a long-run relationship between
government transfers and poverty. The vast majority of these studies impose the restriction that the
relationship between benefit payments and the poverty rate be in growth rates or first differences
(see, e.g., Balke and Slottje, 1993); Vedder and Gallaway, 2001; Enders and Hoover, 2003; and
Hoover et al., 2004). It is well known that the use of stationary first differences or growth rates
2avoids spurious correlations, but this precludes the possibility of a long-run or cointegrating
relationship between the level of government transfers and the level of poverty a priori. Moreover, if
government transfers and poverty rates are cointegrated, the conclusion that there is no statistically
significant relationship between changes or first differences in transfers and poverty does not
necessarily hold in the context of cointegration modeling that allows for a relationship between
transfer payments and poverty both in levels and in first differences. Hence, simply using first
differences or growth rates can lead to serious misspecification problems (see, e.g., Hendry, 1995).
Indeed, some studies estimate a static regression model of the relationship between the level of
government transfers and the level of the poverty rate (see, e.g., Gottschalk and Danziger, 1984;
Blank and Blinder, 1986; Hoynes et al., 2005). However, such regression models are subject to
spurious correlation if government transfers and poverty rates are nonstationary and not
cointegrated. But even in the case of cointegration, the distribution of the estimates from standard
static models is non-normal. Therefore, no final judgment can be passed on the significance of the
estimated coefficients.
Against this background, the objectives of this paper are threefold. Our first objective is to
reexamine the impact of government transfers on poverty, applying cointegration techniques to
aggregate time series data for the United States over the period 1964– 2004. Our main finding using
the single equation cointegration tests proposed by Engle and Granger (1987), Pesaran et al. (2001),
and Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002) is that a long-run relationship exists in levels between the
poverty rate, three types of government transfers (including cash transfers, medical care, as well as
food and housing assistance), and other control variables such as real wages and the number of
female-headed households. Furthermore, our estimates of the long-run parameters using the
dynamic modeling methods of both Stock (1987) and Stock and Watson (1993) indicate that
government transfers play a significant role in reducing poverty in the US. These results are in
3sharp contrast to most of the previous studies and cast serious doubts on the appropriateness of the
methods employed therein.
The second issue we want to address is the cyclicality of the US poverty rate, which is
characterized by rising poverty during recessions and declining poverty during upswings (Freeman,
2001). Typically, the literature on the determinants of poverty in the US uses the (male)
unemployment rate as a measure of the business cycle in regression models (see, e.g., Blank and
Blinder, 1986; Freeman, 2001; Hoover et al., 2004; Hoynes et al., 2005; Hines et al., 2005). Given
statistically significant unemployment rates, this literature generally concludes that the business
cycle is an important determinant of poverty in the US. However, the unemployment rate certainly
does not capture the full effects of the business cycle on poverty. Other channels through which the
business cycle might affect poverty include wage fluctuations of low-wage workers and business-
cycle-induced changes in labor hours that lead to volatility in incomes of the working poor. Also,
the business cycle might affect the ability of families and communities to engage in income
redistribution. Furthermore, the amount of government transfers may vary in response to the
business cycle. Hence, the business cycle can have a major impact on poverty. For this reason, our
poverty function includes not only government transfers and the control variables mentioned above,
but also the business cycle, measured by detrended output. Using this variable to capture the overall
cyclical effects, our estimation results suggest that the business cycle is one of the key determinants
in explaining poverty in the US. We find that a one percent increase/decrease of output above/below
its trend is related to a 2.9 percent decrease/increase in the poverty rate on average during the
sample period. Accordingly, in the case of the US, the poverty impact of the business cycle appears
to be larger in magnitude than the poverty impact of any other relevant variable.
Finally, we do not want to exclude a priori the possibility that business cycle as well as
government transfers themselves are affected by poverty. Furthermore, as stressed by Hoynes et al.
(2005), one can assume that poverty rate dynamics reflect a complicated set of interactions between
4government policies and macroeconomic factors. Surprisingly, however, little research has been
done to examine these issues. Thus, the third objective of this paper is to investigate the dynamic
interactions between poverty, government transfers, and the business cycle. For this purpose, we
construct a small dynamic model for the underlying variables using a vector error correction
approach, similar to the one proposed by Lütkepohl and Wolters (2003). Our results suggest that the
size and the composition of public transfer payments change significantly over the business cycle.
Additionally, we find significant feedback effects of poverty on government transfers, the business
cycle, and the structure of households.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present the poverty
function to be estimated and discuss the underlying data, including their basic properties. In Section
III, we test for cointegration, estimate the long-run parameters of our poverty function, and discuss
the individual equations of our structural vector error correction model. Concluding remarks are
contained in Section IV.
II. VARIABLES, DATA, AND THEIR TIMESERIES PROPERTIES
A. Data and Specification of the Poverty Function
The objective of this study is to investigate if and how aggregate poverty in the US is
affected by government transfers and the business cycle. To this end, we estimate an aggregate
poverty function by means of cointegration techniques. As our measure of poverty, we use the
official US Census Bureau poverty rate, defined as the number of people below the poverty line
divided by the total population. The poverty line, which is based on the Department of Agriculture's
1961 Economy Food Plan, reflects the different consumption requirements of unrelated individuals
as well as families and is updated every year in accordance with the Consumer Price Index. In 2004,
5for example, the poverty threshold for a family of four was about $19,000, and for a single
individual it was approximately $10,000 (Hoynes et al., 2005).
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The government transfer programs that we focus on are: (a) medical care, (b) food and
housing assistance, and (c) public assistance. The first consists primarily of Medicare and Medicaid;
and food and housing assistance programs include public housing, the food stamp program, child
nutrition and special milk programs, supplemental food programs, and commodity donations. While
both medical care and food and housing assistance are based on non-cash transfers, the public
assistance program is purely cash-based. It is composed of supplemental social security income,
family support payments, temporary assistance for needy families (TANF) / aid to families with
dependent children (AFDC),
3 low-income home energy assistance, earned income tax credit, and
veterans’ non-service connected pensions.
4 All data stem from the Historical Tables of the Budget
of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2006, and have been converted into real 2000 dollars
using the implicit GDP deflator from the National Income Accounts.
However, as pointed out by Freeman (2001), many poor families, for whom government
transfers are important, rely more on labor income than on any other resources. Consequently, as
real wages rise, more workers might be able to earn sufficient income to escape poverty. To account
for this, we utilize the average real hourly earnings from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics
expressed in constant 2000 dollars.
5 Given that these data are available from 1964 onwards, the
period under investigation covers the years 1964-2004.
2 Income used to compute official poverty status does not include non-cash government transfers. Alternative poverty
measures that include non-cash transfers thus show lower poverty rates compared to official statistics. However, as
noted by Hoynes et al. (2005), the trend in poverty rates is quite similar across the official and alternative poverty
measures.
3 ADF was reformed in 1996 and replaced by TANF.
4 Foster care, adoption assistance, legal services, and day care assistance also comprise a small part of the public
assistance programs.
5 Since the level of real wages is, of course, related to the level of unemployment, we have decided not to consider
unemployment explicitly. In doing so, we minimize the possibility of multiple cointegrating vectors and thus reduce the
complexity of the empirical analysis. Moreover, a large body of evidence supports that unemployment is related to
poverty in the US (see, e.g., Gottschalk and Danziger, 1984; Osberg, 2000; Blank, 2000; Formby et al., 2001; Enders
and Hoover, 2003; Hoover et al., 2004). In contrast, there is little evidence on the poverty impact of real wages.
6Moreover, as several authors have suggested, there should be a variable that controls for the
structure of American families (see, e.g., Formby et al., 2001; Enders and Hoover, 2003; Hoover et
al., 2004) given the much higher poverty rate among female-headed families than among the total
population below the poverty line (see, e.g., Blank, 2000; Freeman, 2001). We therefore include the
number of female-headed families from the March Current Population Surveys of the US Census
Bureau in our poverty function.
In order to investigate the impact of the business cycle on aggregate poverty, we need an
operational definition of the cyclical component of economic activity. Given that the business cycle
is typically characterized by recurring periods of economic expansion followed by periods of
economic contraction, we measure it in terms of fluctuations of real GDP around a trend:
(1) t t t CY LGDP    , T t ..., , 1  , T = 41 [1964-2004],
where LGDPt is the natural logarithm of the Department of Commerce's real GDP, which is
evaluated at constant 2000 prices, CYt is the business cycle, and t is the trend. Here, we impose a
linear trend, since the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for LGDPt clearly rejects the unit root
hypothesis in favor of trend-stationarity (see Table I). Note that the trend-stationary model of US
GDP, in which the business cycles are modeled as stationary fluctuations around a linear trend, is
supported by several studies. Ben-David and Papell (1995), Ben-David, Lumsdaine, and Papell
(2003), Papell and Prodan (2004), for example, reject the unit root null for long-term US real GDP
in favor of a deterministic trend with structural breaks in 1929 (the Great Depression) and/or 1940
(World War II). Hence, assuming that LGDPt is trend-stationary and that there has been no
permanent shock to output during the 1964– 2004 period, we measure the business cycle as a linear
detrended log of real GDP ─   t h a t   i s ,   w e   u s e   t h e   r e s i d u a l s   f r o m   a   r e g r e s s i o n   o f   LGDPt on a constant
and a time trend.
7Hence, the long-run poverty function we have in mind is of the following form:
(2) t t t t t t t t error CY LF LW LPA LHF LM LPOV        6 5 4 3 2 1       ,
where LPOVt is the logarithm of the poverty rate, LMt is the logarithm of real medical care
expenditures, LHFt is the logarithm of real housing and food expenditures, LPAt is the logarithm of
real public assistance, LWt is the logarithm of the real wage, LFt is the logarithm of the number of
female family heads, CYt is the business cycle, errort is a stationary error term, and a1, a2, a3, a4, a5,
a6 are constant elasticities.
It is important to note that there should be two cointegrating relations in equation (2). We
expect LPOVt, LMt, LHFt, LPAt, LWt, and LFt to be integrated and possibly cointegrated. The other
is presumably given by CYt, because the business cycle is expected to be stationary and thus to be
cointegrated with itself.
B. Time Series Properties
In Figure I LPOVt, LMt, LHFt, LPAt, LWt, LFt and CYt are plotted for the period 1964– 2004.
In order to determine the time series properties of these variables, we have carried out ADF tests.
Because LMt, LHFt, LPAt, LWt, and LFt are trending, a linear time trend was included in the test
regressions. To test whether a linear trend is necessary in the testing equation for LPOVt, we
estimated the ADF regression initially with a linear time trend. Since the trend, however, turned out
to be insignificant, it was excluded from the regression. The ADF test for the residuals, i.e., the
business cycle (CYt), was conducted without a constant and trend.
[Figure 1 around here]
Given the considerable evidence that data-dependent methods of selecting the lag length k
are superior to the a priori choice of a fixed k (Perron, 1997), we used the t-sig method to choose the
8number of lags in the ADF regressions. Here k max was specified to be six. If the last included lag
was insignificant, the number of lags was reduced by one and the test regressions were reestimated
until a significant lagged variable was found. If none of the coefficients on the lagged variables
were found to be significant, no lags were utilized in the tests. Table I reports the results.
[Table 1 around here]
As can be seen, for LPOVt, LMt, LHFt, LPAt, LWt and LFt, we cannot reject the unit root null
at the 5% level of significance. Since the unit root hypothesis can be rejected for the first
differences, we conclude that LPOVt, LMt, LHFt, LPAt, LWt and LFt are integrated of order one,
I(1). According to the results in Table I, CYt, in contrast, can clearly be treated as stationary.
III. MODELINGPOVERTY
A. Testing for Cointegration
Because LPOVt, LMt, LHFt, LPAt, LWt, and LFt are I(1), the next step in our analysis is an
investigation of the cointegration properties of these time series. The business cycle is stationary
and can thus already be regarded as a cointegration relationship. Therefore CYt is excluded from the
cointegration analysis of LPOVt, LMt, LHFt, LPAt, LWt, and LFt. Note that such an analysis should
generally be conducted using system techniques, but we have a relatively large number of variables
and few observations. Hence, we use single-equation models.
First we use the Engle-Granger (1987) approach to test the null of no cointegration. The null
of no cointegration implies that the estimated residuals, êt, from the equation
(3) t t t t t t t e LF LW LPA LHF LM c LPOV        5 4 3 2 1     
are I(1), whereas the alternative hypothesis implies that the estimated residuals are I(0). We
estimate the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression
9(4) t j t
k
j
j t t v e e e      

  ˆ ˆ ˆ
1
1   ,
where the null of no cointegration is rejected if  ˆ t is greater than the critical values reported by
MacKinnon (1991).
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To determine the lag length k, we again use the t-sig method. Starting with six lags, this
procedure selects five lags for our regression. Using k = 5, the estimated ADF t-statistic amounts to
25 . 5 . Comparing this value with the corresponding 5% critical value, 13 . 5 , we can reject the
null of no cointegration at the 5% level.
However, the Engle-Granger approach has been criticized among other things for imposing
a common factor restriction on the dynamics of the relationship between the variables, which is
only appropriate when the short-run elasticities equal the long-run elasticities (Kremers et al.,
1992). We therefore provide additional evidence on cointegration by applying the autoregressive
distributed lag (ARDL) approach developed by Pesaran et al. (2001). This procedure is applicable
irrespective of whether the explanatory variables are I(1) or I(0). It is based on a conditional error
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6 Critical values depend on number of regressors and the sample size.
10In this model, which can be interpreted as an autoregressive distributed lag model, we test the
absence of a cointegration relationship between LPOVt, LMt, LHFt, LPAt, LWt, and LFt by
calculating the F-statistic for the null of no cointegration
(6) : 0 H 0 5 5 4 3 2      b b b b b
against the alternative
(7) : 1 H 0 6 5 4 3 2      b b b b b .
The distribution of the test statistic under the null depends on the order of integration of the
variables. In the case where (a) all variables are I(0), the asymptotic 1% critical value is 3.41 (see
Pesaran et al., (2001), p. 300, Table CI(iii)). If the calculated F-statistic falls below this value, the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected. In the case where (b) one or more series are I(0) and one or more
series are I(1), the critical value falls in the interval [3.41, 4.68]. If the F-statistic falls within these
bounds, the result is inconclusive; thus the order of integration must be known before any
conclusion can be drawn. In the case where (c) LPOVt, LMt, LHFt, LPAt, LWt, and LFt are I(1), the
1% critical value is 4.68. If the F-statistic lies above 4.68, the null of no cointegration is rejected at
the 1% level.
In order to determine the lag length, k, the Schwarz criterion is used. The Schwarz criterion
has been shown to lead to consistent estimates in both stationary and nonstationary models, while
the Akaike criterion is characterized by a positive limiting probability of overfitting (see, e.g.,
Pötscher, 1989; 1990). The Schwarz criterion suggests one lag for our model, k = 1; hence, we
estimate the ARDL model with one lag. Here, the calculated F-statistic for the null of no
cointegration amounts to 7.08. Since this value exceeds the upper bound of the critical value band
11[3.41, 4.68], we reject the null of no cointegration at the 1% significance level. Note that this result
confirms our earlier finding that LPOVt, LMt, LHFt, LPAt, LWt, and LFt are I(1), because the F-
statistic (7.08) is higher than the 1% critical value, if all series are I(1).
B. Estimation of the Long-Run Poverty Function
Having found that LPOVt, LMt, LHFt, LPAt, LWt, and LFt are cointegrated, we proceed
under the assumption that the relation
(8) t t t t t t LF LW LPA LHF LM LPOV 5 4 3 2 1          
is stationary. Because the business cycle is also stationary and because CYt is expected to be an
important explanatory variable in the fully specified equation, it is included it in the long-run
relation. To this end, we follow Herzer and Nowak (forthcoming), who estimate models with I(1)
and I(0) regressors making use of the Stock (1987) approach. This approach is based on the
conditional error correction model (5), where the current and lagged values of the detrended GDP
a r e   i n c l u d e d   a s   e x p l a n a t o r y   v a r i a b l e s .   A c c o r d i n g l y ,   w e   r e g r e s s   Δ LPOVt on LPOVt-1, LMt-1, LHFt-1,
LPAt-1, LWt-1, and LFt-1the differences of LPOVt, LMt, LHFt, LPAt, LWt and LFtup to lag order two,
CYt up to lag order two, the lagged differences of LPOVt also up to lag order two, and an intercept
term. Moreover, we introduce an intervention dummy, i_81/82, in order to control for a large outlier
in the empirical model. The dummy variable accounts for the poverty effects of the 1981– 82
recession that are obviously not sufficiently captured by the business cycle variable, and takes the
value of 1 in 1981 and -1 in 1982. After applying the general-to-specific model reduction procedure
by successively eliminating the least significant variables, we obtain the following equation (t-
statistics in parentheses beneath the estimated coefficients):
12(9)
) 566 . 3 ( ) 685 . 2 ( ) 011 . 2 ( ) 428 . 3 (
82 / 81 _ 043 . 0 025 . 0 387 . 0 647 . 0
) 858 . 5 ( ) 732 . 3 ( ) 846 . 11 ( ) 615 . 8 ( ) 221 . 3 (
118 . 1 205 . 0 971 . 1 703 . 0 473 . 0
) 915 . 5 ( ) 294 . 6 ( ) 215 . 2 ( ) 509 . 12 ( ) 810 . 7 (
136 . 0 099 . 0 036 . 0 678 . 0 735 . 3
2 2 1
1 1
1 1 1 1

      
  
      
    
      
  
 
   
i LM LF LF
LF LPA CY LF LW
LPA LHF LM LPOV LPOV
t t t
t t t t t
t t t t t
) 35 . 0 ( 16 . 1 ) 4 ( ) 85 . 0 ( 17 . 0 ) 2 ( ) 65 . 0 ( 21 . 0 ) 1 (
) 28 . 0 ( 35 . 1 ) 5 ( ) 71 . 0 ( 45 . 0 ) 3 ( ) 81 . 0 ( 05 . 0 ) 1 (
) 65 . 0 ( 21 . 0 ) 1 ( ) 43 . 0 ( 69 . 1 015 . 0 95 . 0 2
  
  
   
ARCH ARCH ARCH
LM LM LM
RESET JB SE R
The numbers in parentheses behind the values of the diagnostic test statistics are the corresponding
p-values. JB is the Jarque-Bera test for normality, RESET is the usual test for general nonlinearity
and misspecification, LM(k), k = 1, 3, 5 are Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests for autocorrelation
based on 1, 3, and 5 lags, and ARCH(k) is an LM test for autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity of order k, k =1, 2, and 4. As can be seen, all p-values exceed the conventional
significance levels. Hence, we conclude that neither obvious nonlinearity or misspecification is
present, nor that the residuals show any signs of nonnormality, autocorrelation or autoregressive
heteroscedasticity.
The stability of the estimated equation is checked using the CUSUM test and the CUSUM of
squares test. Figure II shows the results along with the 5% critical lines. As can be observed, neither
of the two tests indicate any instability of the estimated equation.
[Figure 2 around here]
A significant negative coefficient of the lagged dependent level variable indicates
cointegration. Therefore, as the findings of Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002) suggest, this
coefficient –which we denote here as 2 b –can be used to test for cointegration. Accordingly, the
null to be tested is 2 b = 0. Critical values are provided by Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002). For 39
13included observations and six variables in the cointegration relation, the finite sample critical value
at the 1% level is – 5.14. Since the absolute value of the estimated t-statistic of 2 ˆ b , 509 . 12 , is
higher than the absolute value of the 1% critical value, 14 . 5 , we conclude (as in the previous
section) that the null of no cointegration can be rejected. Normalizing on the coefficient of POVt-1
yields the long-run relation
(10) t t t t t t LF LW LPA LHF LM LPOV 037 . 1 697 . 0 201 . 0 146 . 0 053 . 0       ,
which may be interpreted as an essential part of our poverty function. Adding the (normalized)
impact of the business cycle finally gives the following complete poverty function
(11) t t t t t t t CY LF LW LPA LHF LM LPOV 907 . 2 037 . 1 697 . 0 201 . 0 146 . 0 053 . 0        .
As can be seen, our results suggest that government transfer programs play an important poverty-
reducing role. This is in sharp contrast to the earlier studies by Blank and Blinder (1986), Peterson
and Rom (1989), Gottschalk and Danziger (1984), Balke and Slottje (1993), Formby et al. (2001),
Vedder and Gallaway (2001), Enders and Hoover (2003), and Hoover et al. (2004) who found either
no statistically significant poverty-reducing impact of government transfers, or even a statistically
positive relationship between transfers and poverty. We infer from the estimated poverty function
that the poverty rate decreases by 0.053 percent due to a one percent increase in medical care, by
0.146 percent due to a one percent increase in housing and food assistance, and by 0.201 percent
due to a one percent increase in public assistance payments. From this we conclude that the work
disincentive effects of government transfers on poverty, described at the beginning of the paper, are
not dominant. This conclusion is indirectly supported by the studies of Winkler (1991), Moffit
(1992), and Painter (2001), who indeed found that the labor supply is negatively affected by
14government transfers such as ADF/TANF, Medicaid, and housing assistance, but that these negative
effects are quite small.
As expected, the poverty rate is reduced by higher wages and increased by the number of
female family heads. The estimated relationship suggests that a one percent increase in real wages is
associated with a 0.697 percent decrease in poverty, while a one percent increase in female family
heads is associated with a 1.037 percent increase in poverty. Consequently, as Freeman (2001, p. 7)
p o i n t s   o u t ,   “ ... the absence of a male breadwinner in families invariably increases poverty in a
world where men earn more on average than women, and where many families need two earners to
achieve a reasonable level of income. ”   T h i s   r e s u l t   i s   i n   l i n e   w i t h   t h e   f i n d i n g s   o f   E n d e r s   a n d   H o o v e r  
(2003), who also conclude that an increase in female family heads is associated with an increase in
the US poverty rate.
Looking at the coefficient of CYt, it immediately becomes clear that the long-run poverty
function is strongly dominated by the business cycle. A one percent upswing in the business cycle
leads to a 2.907 percent decrease in the poverty rate, while business cycle troughs increase poverty
to the same extent. Accordingly, the effects of the business cycle on poverty are larger in magnitude
than the effects of all other relevant variables.
One may still wonder how robust these results are. It is well known that the cointegration
vector and thus our long-run poverty function can only be estimated efficiently from the above
conditional error correction model if the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. For a
robustness check, we therefore use the Dynamic OLS (DOLS) procedure advocated by Stock and
Watson (1993), since DOLS generates unbiased and asymptotically efficient estimates for variables
that cointegrate, even with endogenous regressors. It involves regressing any I(1) variable on other
I(1) variables, any I(0) variables, and leads and lags of the first differences of the I(1) variables (for
a practical example, see Herzer and Nowak, forthcoming). Hence, our DOLS regression is
15(12)
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where α 1, α 2, α 3, α 4, α 5, α 6 are the long-r u n   e l a s t i c i t i e s ,   a n d   Φ 1,   Φ 2  , Φ 3,   Φ 4,   Φ 5 are coefficients of
lead and lag differences of the I( 1 )   r e g r e s s o r s .   N o t e   t h a t   Φ 1,   Φ 2,   Φ 3,   Φ 4,   Φ 5 are treated as nuisance
parameters that serve to adjust for possible endogeneity, autocorrelation, and non-normal residuals.
Like model (9), the DOLS equation is estimated with up to two leads and lags (k=2). The following
equation results when applying the general-to-specific modeling approach (t-statistics are given in
parentheses beneath the estimated coefficients):
(13)
) 09 . 3 ( ) 07 . 2 ( ) 709 . 4 ( ) 43 . 3 ( ) 72 . 12 (
82 / 81 _ 050 . 0 079 . 0 174 . 0 689 . 1 929 . 2
) 30 . 10 ( ) 04 . 6 ( ) 11 . 5 ( ) 79 . 7 ( ) 48 . 3 ( ) 31 . 6 (
942 . 0 955 . 0 177 . 0 116 . 0 088 . 0 089 . 4
1 1 1
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t t t t
t t t t t t
) 82 . 0 ( 38 . 0 ) 4 ( ) 69 . 0 ( 37 . 0 ) 2 ( ) 68 . 0 ( 17 . 0 ) 1 (
) 52 . 0 ( 87 . 0 ) 5 ( ) 24 . 0 ( 52 . 1 ) 3 ( ) 41 . 0 ( 71 . 0 ) 1 (
) 68 . 0 ( 17 . 0 ) 1 ( ) 50 . 0 ( 37 . 1 020 . 0 96 . 0 2
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ARCH ARCH ARCH
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RESET JB SE R
As can be seen, the diagnostic test statistics suggest that the model is well specified. The
assumption of normally distributed residuals cannot be rejected (JB). The Lagrange multiplier (LM)
tests for autocorrelation based on 1, 3 and 5 lags, respectively, do not indicate any problems
concerning autocorrelated residuals. The model also passes the LM tests for autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH(k)) of order k = 1, 2, 4, and the RESET test does not suggest
nonlinearity. Furthermore, the CUSUM and CUSUM of squares tests are presented in Figure III,
indicating a stable relationship between poverty, government transfers to the poor, real wages,
16female family heads, and the business cycle. Note that we also performed a series of Chow forecast
tests which were not significant at the 10 percent level and are thus not reported to save space.
[Figure 3 around here]
The DOLS approach finally yields the following cointegrating relation and the following
long-run poverty function respectively
(14) t t t t t t t ect LF LW LPA LHF LM LPOV        942 . 0 955 . 0 177 . 0 116 . 0 088 . 0 ,
(15) t t t t t t t CY LF LW LPA LHF LM LPOV 929 . 2 943 . 0 955 . 0 177 . 0 116 . 0 088 . 0        ,
which are very close to the results obtained from the Stock approach. From this we infer that the
results are very robust to different estimation techniques. Consequently, the above qualitative
conclusions about the poverty impacts of medical care expenditures, housing, food and public
assistance expenditures, real wages, the number of female-headed households, and the business
cycle remain unchanged.
For a more complete picture of the channels of poverty-reducing policies, we should model
the dynamic interactions between these variables. Of course, a model which completely explains all
our variables would theoretically require modeling the whole US economy. Because this is not
feasible, we construct a seven-equation model.
C. The Empirical Model
O u r   m o d e l i n g   a p p r o a c h   i s   s i m i l a r   t o   t h a t   u s e d   i n   L ü t k e p o h l   a n d   Wo l t e r s ’   ( 2 0 0 3 )  
investigation of the German monetary policy. It involves treating the error correction term
(16) t t t t t t t LF LW LPA LHF LM LPOV ect 942 . 0 955 . 0 177 . 0 116 . 0 088 . 0      
17from equation (14) as an additional stationary variable in specifying the seven-equation model.
Recall that weak exogeneity is not required for the DOLS procedure. Therefore we continue our
analysis using the cointegrating relation derived from the DOLS approach, rather than from the
Stock procedure.
Our seven-equation model starts from a vector error correction model with ∆ LPOVt, ∆ LMt,
∆ LHFt, ∆ LPAt, ∆ LWt and CYt, as dependent variables, where all equations are in reduced form.
Accordingly they initially contain as explanatory variables 1  t ect , ∆ LPOVt-i, ∆ LMt-i, ∆ LHFt-i,
∆ LPAt-i, as well as ∆ LWt-i up to lag order two (i = 2), and CYt-i also up to lag order two (i = 2).
Notice that CYt does not appear in first differences because the business cycle is already stationary.
As in the previous analysis, variables with insignificant coefficients are then eliminated
successively according to the lowest t-values, while the error correction term in each equation is
kept until the end. The error correction term is eliminated if it turns out to be insignificant in the
model in which all other insignificant variables are already eliminated. This strategy results in the
equations presented in the following.
Before interpreting the results, it should be noted that the modeling approach described
above is justified if it results in a system without instantaneous correlation between the residuals.


















































00 . 1 10 . 0 06 . 0 21 . 0 07 . 0 35 . 0 39 . 0
10 . 0 00 . 1 02 . 0 06 . 0 31 . 0 14 . 0 02 . 0
06 . 0 02 . 0 00 . 1 23 . 0 21 . 0 25 . 0 11 . 0
21 . 0 06 . 0 23 . 0 00 . 1 09 . 0 16 . 0 29 . 0
07 . 0 31 . 0 21 . 0 09 . 0 00 . 1 14 . 0 05 . 0
35 . 0 14 . 0 25 . 0 16 . 0 14 . 0 00 . 1 30 . 0
39 . 0 02 . 0 11 . 0 30 . 0 05 . 0 30 . 0 00 . 1
18Because all off-diagonal elements are relatively small, we proceed under the assumption that there
is no problem with autocorrelated residuals and that, hence, we have a recursive system as
postulated for identification.
The estimated poverty equation is
(17)
) 80 . 1 ( ) 94 . 2 ( ) 10 . 2 (
83 / 82 _ 044 . 0 76 _ 092 . 0 346 . 1
) 21 . 2 ( ) 76 . 3 ( ) 19 . 6 ( ) 55 . 4 ( ) 56 . 4 (
411 . 1 012 . 1 655 . 0 842 . 0 469 . 3
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) 40 . 0 ( 04 . 1 ) 4 ( ) 95 . 0 ( 06 . 0 ) 2 ( ) 54 . 0 ( 37 . 0 ) 1 (
) 76 . 0 ( 52 . 0 ) 5 ( ) 80 . 0 ( 34 . 0 ) 3 ( ) 71 . 0 ( 14 . 0 ) 1 (
) 13 . 0 ( 39 . 2 ) 1 ( ) 42 . 0 ( 73 . 1 028 . 0 73 . 0 2
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ARCH ARCH ARCH
LM LM LM
RESET JB SE R
Note that the deterministic terms are not the same as in equations (9) and (13). For example, an
impulse dummy for 1976, im_76, was needed to achieve a normal distribution of the residuals.
7 A
possible reason for the importance of im_76 is the fast economic recovery after the 1974-75
recession that caused a sharp decrease in the poverty rate in 1976. Furthermore, the intervention
dummy i_82/83 had to be introduced in order to account for the poverty effects of the 1982-83
recession that are obviously not sufficiently captured in the detrended GDP.
8 The error correction
term is statistically significant and correctly negatively signed. Accordingly, poverty shrinks if it
exceeds its long-run equilibrium level, as one would expect in a stable model. The size of the
coefficient of 1  t ect suggests that the speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium after a
shock is remarkably high. More precisely, it indicates that around 85 percent of the deviation from
the long-run equilibrium is corrected every year. Moreover, the business cycle is Granger-causal for
7 im_76 is one in 1976 and zero otherwise.
8 i_82/83 takes the value of 1 in 1982, -1 in 1983, and zero otherwise.
19poverty, as indicated by the significance of the lagged business cycle variable, CYt-1. Interestingly,
the long-run and short-run effects of real wages on poverty differ. In the short run (as shown by
∆ LWt-2), real wages are positively related to poverty. This might indicate that poverty is driven by
unemployment, and that unemployment, in turn, is caused by real wages rising faster than
productivity.
The medical care expenditure equation turns out to be
(18)
) 56 . 4 ( ) 25 . 35 ( ) 03 . 2 (
72 _ 019 . 0 67 _ 780 . 0 245 . 0
) 13 . 2 ( ) 17 . 5 ( ) 24 . 11 ( ) 68 . 2 ( ) 52 . 2 (
112 . 1 141 . 2 360 . 0 217 . 0 841 . 0
2
2 1 1 1
im im POV
LW LW LM ect LM
t
t t t t t
   
  
         

   
) 48 . 0 ( 89 . 0 ) 4 ( ) 31 . 0 ( 22 . 1 ) 2 ( ) 15 . 0 ( 14 . 2 ) 1 (
) 63 . 0 ( 70 . 0 ) 5 ( ) 67 . 0 ( 52 . 0 ) 3 ( ) 89 . 0 ( 02 . 0 ) 1 (
) 69 . 0 ( 17 . 0 ) 1 ( ) 34 . 0 ( 14 . 2 021 . 0 98 . 0 2
  
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An impulse dummy for 1967, im_67, was needed to achieve a normal distribution of the residuals.
It presumably captures the effects of the Vietnam War, which brought with it a sharp increase in
medical care expenditures in 1967 (see Figure I). Moreover, an impulse dummy for 1972, im_73,
had to be introduced in order to control for an unexplainable outlier in the model.
9 The business
cycle variable turned out to be insignificant and, hence, was eliminated from the model. From this it
can be concluded that the business cycle has no Granger-causal impact on medical care expenditure
growth. The negative coefficient o f   t h e   e r r o r   c o r r e c t i o n   t e r m   i m p l i e s   t h a t   “ e x c e s s   p o v e r t y ”   l o w e r s  
the growth of medical care expenditures. The rationale for this finding will become apparent below.
As equation (19) and (20) will show, if poverty overshoots its long-run level, the downward
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium does occur via increased housing and food assistance
20as well as public assistance payments, while the growth of medical care expenditures decreases.
Obviously there is a redistribution of resources from the medical care program to the housing, food
a n d   p u b l i c   a s s i s t a n c e   p r o g r a m s   d u e   t o   a   “ p o v e r t y   s h o c k ” .   T h i s   p o i n t   w i l l   b e   t a k e n   u p   a g a i n   l a t e r   o n .  
The equation for housing and food assistance was found to be
(19)
) 14 . 5 ( ) 31 . 9 ( ) 31 . 5 ( ) 16 . 3 (
72 _ 312 . 0 71 _ 566 . 0 70 _ 326 . 0 567 . 2
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003 . 3 718 . 0 677 . 0 830 . 2
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) 92 . 0 ( 23 . 0 ) 4 ( ) 78 . 0 ( 25 . 0 ) 2 ( ) 42 . 0 ( 66 . 0 ) 1 (
) 62 . 0 ( 72 . 0 ) 5 ( ) 44 . 0 ( 92 . 0 ) 3 ( ) 14 . 0 ( 28 . 2 ) 1 (
) 19 . 0 ( 830 . 1 ) 1 ( ) 90 . 0 ( 22 . 0 058 . 0 85 . 0 2
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Three impulse dummy variables (im_70, im_71, im_71) were needed to obtain a well-specified
equation.
10 The positive coefficient of the error correction term 1  t ect suggests that the downward
adjustment towards the long-run poverty equilibrium takes place through increased housing and
food payments, as already noted. Consequently, housing and food –as well as medical care
payments –are not weakly exogenous to the system. Moreover, the positive coefficient of the
lagged business cycle variable indicates that business cycle downswings (upswings) lower
(stimulate) the growth of housing and food benefits. From this we conclude that business cycle
fluctuations tend to affect poverty through their impact on housing and food payments. It should
also be noted that equation (19) includes one lag of real wages. The negative sign of this variable
suggests that the demand of the poor for public housing and food assistance programs –and hence
the growth of public housing and food expenditures – is decreased by the income effect of the wage
9 im_67 (im_72) is one in 1967 (1972) and zero elsewhere.
10 im_70 (im_71, im_72) is one in 1970 (1971, 1972) and zero elsewhere.
21change. On the other hand, because of the various interactions between the variables, the exact
reason for the negative impact of 1   t LPOV on t LHF  is not clear. One possible explanation could
be that poverty affects the business cycle (as the discussion of equation (23) will show), and
poverty-related business cycle downswings, in turn, tend to dampen the increase in housing and
food assistance.
The public assistance equation is
(20)
) 22 . 3 ( ) 52 . 4 ( ) 36 . 4 ( ) 24 . 3 ( ) 31 . 3 (
82 _ 147 . 0 73 _ 210 . 0 950 . 1 578 . 0 409 . 2 2 1
 
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Two impulse dummies for the years 1973 and 1982 were introduced to avoid the effects of outlying
observations. As in the equations above, the public assistance equation includes the error correction
term 1  t ect .   I t s   p o s i t i v e   s i g n   i n d i c a t e s   t h a t   “ e x c e s s   p o v e r t y ”   s t i m u l a t e s   the growth of public
assistance payments. Since the growth of government expenditures on both public assistance as well
as housing and food responds positively, while the growth of expenditures on medical care responds
negatively to excess poverty, we conclude (as already noted): a “ p o v e r t y   s h o c k ”   a p p e a r s   t o   c a u s e   a  
redistribution of resources from the medical care program to the housing, food and public assistance
programs. Moreover, similar to equation (19), the positive sign of the business cycle variable
suggests that the US government tends to increase (decrease) public assistance payments when the
business cycle is up (down).
For real wages, we found the following autoregressive model
22(21)
) 95 . 2 ( ) 06 . 7 ( ) 61 . 1 (
384 . 0 957 . 0 003 . 0 2 1
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The error correction term turned out to be insignificant. Hence, real wages are weakly exogenous.
Since the wage equation contains own lags only, real wages can actually be treated as strictly
exogenous. The absence of the business cycle variable indicates that business cycle fluctuations
have no statistically significant (Granger-causal) impact on the growth of real wages, which may be
due to wage rigidities.
11 We can therefore conclude that the US business cycle is not related to
poverty through the wage channel. This conclusion is indirectly supported by the studies of Solon et
al. (1994) and Kandil and Woods (2002). The former found for low-skilled workers that business
cycle adjustments result in a significant change in labor hours, not in hourly wages. Kandi and
Woods (2002) obtained a similar result for workers age 25 and older, who make up the largest
group of workers in the United States. This might explain our statistically insignificant relationship
between changes in (aggregate) real wages and the business cycle. If, however, the growth of hourly
earnings is independent of business cycle fluctuations, we can conclude that the business cycle does
not influence poverty through real wage changes (measured by growth in hourly earnings). Other
plausible mechanisms by which business cycle fluctuations might affect poverty in the US include,
of course, fluctuations in employment and income from work ─   t h a t   i s ,   t h e   p r o d u c t   o f   h o u r l y   w a g e s  
and the number of hours worked.
The equation for the number of female-headed households turns out to be
23(23)
) 95 . 1 ( ) 88 . 2 ( ) 65 . 2 ( ) 28 . 2 ( ) 334 . 2 (
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where an impulse dummy for 1983 was needed to achieve a normal distribution of the residuals.
12
The positive coefficient of the error correction term 1  t ect   i m p l i e s   t h a t   “ e x c e s s   p o v e r t y ”   s t i m u l a t e s  
growth in the number of female-headed households. Because these families are created through
divorce and the birth of children to as yet unmarried women, we interpret this finding as evidence
that poverty erodes family stability, reducing the likelihood that individuals will marry and
increasing the likelihood that their marriages will deteriorate. Consequently, poverty is a cause and
a consequence of non-marriage and marital disruption. Interestingly, the business cycle appears to
be positively related to an increased number of female-headed households. This finding is not
surprising given that divorce rates tend to fluctuate procyclically in many countries (see, e.g.,
Becker, 1988; Huang, 2003). As already explained by Ogburn and Thomas (1922), one reason for
more divorces in times of economic prosperity is that divorces are expensive, involving lawyer and
court fees and perhaps alimony. Furthermore, the economic theory of marriage suggests that
i n c r e a s i n g   w o m e n ’ s   w a g e s   i n   t i m e s   o f   economic growth may reduce the gains from staying married
(or marrying) by diminishing the benefits of household specialization (Becker, 1981). Since
business cycle downswings increase poverty, which, in turn, raises the number of female-headed
households, business cycle fluctuations obviously may have two opposing effects: (i) an indirect
effect on those families living close to the poverty line by pushing them into poverty in times of
11 Note that the available empirical evidence of the cyclicality of the real wages in the US is inconclusive about the
direction as well as about the degree of cyclical movement in response to business cycle fluctuations (see, for example,
Bodkin 1969; Abraham and Haltiwanger 1995; Kandil and Woods 2002).
12 im_83 is one in 1983 and zero elsewhere.
24business cycle downturns, undermining family cohesion, and thus increasing the number of female-
headed households; and (i) a direct effect on families (who are not vulnerable to poverty) by
increasing the financial incentives of marriage and raising the financial burden of divorce or
separation in business cycle downswings, and hence decreasing the number of female-headed
households.
The business cycle equation is
(23)
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70 _ 038 . 0 480 . 0 825 . 0
) 93 . 2 ( ) 81 . 1 ( ) 50 . 4 ( ) 52 . 4 (




   
  




LHF LPOV ect CY
t t
t t t t
) 77 . 0 ( 45 . 0 ) 4 ( ) 65 . 0 ( 43 . 0 ) 2 ( ) 47 . 0 ( 57 . 0 ) 1 (
) 57 . 0 ( 78 . 0 ) 5 ( ) 97 . 0 ( 08 . 0 ) 3 ( ) 68 . 0 ( 17 . 0 ) 1 (
) 42 . 0 ( 67 . 0 ) 1 ( ) 67 . 0 ( 81 . 0 013 . 0 60 . 0 2
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where one impulse dummy variable (im_70) was needed to obtain a well-specified equation.
13 The
equation includes the error correction 1  t ect   w i t h   a   n e g a t i v e   s i g n   s o   t h a t   “ e x c e s s   p o v e r t y ”   l o w e r s  
economic activity around its log-run trend. In addition to the error correction term and the own lag
2  t CY ,   e q u a t i o n   ( 2 3 )   i n c l u d e s   l a g s   o f   Δ LPOVt,   Δ LHFt,   a n d   Δ LWt, indicating that the business cycle
is caused by demand-related factors such as poverty, real wages, and housing and food payments.
Thus, poverty is affected by the business cycle, which is in turn affected by poverty.
13 im_70 is one in 1970 and zero elsewhere.
25IV.SUMMARY ANDCONCLUSIONS
The objectives of this paper were threefold. First, we reexamined the impact of government
transfers on US poverty empirically by applying cointegration techniques to aggregate time series
data over the period 1964-2004. In sharp contrast to most previous studies, we found that
government transfers (cash transfers, medical care as well as food and housing assistance) play a
significant role in reducing poverty. Second, we investigated the impact of the business cycle on US
poverty and found its effect to be not only statistically significant but also larger in magnitude than
any of the other relevant poverty determinants. Third, we empirically analyzed the dynamic
interactions between poverty, government transfers, and the business cycle. Our estimations showed
that the overall amount and composition of government transfers changes over the business cycle.
Moreover, we found significant feedback effects of poverty on government transfers, the business
cycle and household structure. Summing up, our results demonstrate how modern techniques of
time series analysis can be used to shed more light on the determinants of poverty in an
industrialized society and their patterns of interaction.
The implications for economic and social policy are obvious and far-reaching. The dominant
influence of the business cycle on changes in poverty clearly calls for improved macroeconomic
stabilization policies that reduce the vulnerability of low-income people and households to poverty.
Even if it is not clear whether these improvements can be achieved by pure demand management or
pure supply-side policies –or an intelligent mixture of both –a successful dampening of GDP
fluctuations around the trend seems to be an effective way to fight poverty. In addition, the cyclical
development of public transfers to the poor could be reduced in order to eliminate one of channels
through which GDP fluctuations affect poverty. And finally, strengthening two-parent household
structures also seems to be a promising way to reduce the negative effects of the business cycle on
poverty. None of these conclusions is totally new, but they have never been brought together in the
context of a comprehensive and empirically well-grounded study of poverty.
26Potential areas for future research are clear. The results for the US should be compared to
similar investigations for other industrialized and developing countries. Here, we can expect to find
different patterns of dynamic interaction in developing countries where government transfers still
play a minor role. For industrialized countries, future research should focus much more closely on
the interaction between real wages, the business cycle, and poverty, in order to clarify this
relationship further than we have been able to do in the present study.
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a Lag length Value of test statistic Probability
b
Levels
LGDPt c, t (4.93
***
)
c 1 -4.95 0.001
LPOVt C 5 -2.54 0.115
LMt c, t 6 -3.25 0.092
LHFt c, t 1 -2.20 0.479
LPAt c, t 0 -1.86 0.656
LWt c, t 4 -2.48 0.337
LFt c, t 0 -0.06 0.993
CYt - 1 -5.06 0.000
First Differences
Δ LPOVt C 1 -4.22 0.002
Δ LMt C 0 -4.87 0.000
Δ LHFt c, t 1 -4.08 0.014
Δ LPAt C 0 -5.82 0.000
Δ LWt C 1 -3.63 0.010
Δ LFt C 0 -5.60 0.000
a c = constant; t = linear time trend;
b MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
c t-value of the time trend in parentheses,
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32FIGURE II
STABILITY ANALYSIS FOR MODEL(9)
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